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Introduction 
 
How is government spending associated with private donations in different fields of welfare? In 
an era of continued pressure on governments to decrease social welfare expenditure, the question 
whether private philanthropic donations can be seen as supplementary or complementary to 
government expenditure, gains renewed importance (Andreoni and Payne, 2011; Van Oorschot 
and Arts, 2005, Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Young, 2000). Previous 
literature hypothesizes that generous government expenditure on public goods and services 
discourages private initiatives to create such goods and services (e.g. Künemund and Rein, 1999; 
Suanet et al., 2012). This assumption is known as the “crowding-out” hypothesis (Abrams and 
Schitz, 1978; Andreoni, 1993; Brooks, 2004; Kingma, 1989; Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982).  
Other research, however, rejects the crowding-out hypothesis by arguing that a well-
developed welfare state promotes civil society (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). It posits that 
generous government expenditures encourage private engagement in the form of philanthropic 
contributions of money and time (Anheier and Toepler, 1999; Khanna and Sandler, 2000: 1544; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1981); and is referred to as the “crowding-in” hypothesis.  
Despite a large number of empirical studies studying this relationship the debate is still 
unsettled. Systematic literature reviews show that estimates of the effects of government 
expenditures on philanthropic giving are widely disparate.  They are context sensitive, or depend 
on the nature of the government expenditures and on the fiels of welfare involved (De Wit and 
Bekkers, 2017; Lu, 2016). Also, the large majority of studies refer to data from the U.S., and less 
is known about the relationship in countries with different welfare-state traditions (De Wit, 2016; 
Bekkers, 2016). Few studies have investigated the crowding-out hypothesis across countries. 
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Due to the lack of available datasets, these studies only examined measures on the decision to 
give or not (Bredtman, 2016; De Wit, 2016; Einolf, 2017; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Pennerstorfer 
and Neumayr, 2017), or an aggregate measure of private nonprofit revenues (Sokolowski, 2013). 
To study how individual giving responds to government programs, information about the 
individual level of donations is required. Furthermore, many empirical studies examine aggregate 
measures of both, government funding and individual donations, and it is unlikely that a 
relationship is unidirectional across all fields of welfare  which are supported by government  
(Brooks, 2004, p. 173; Khanna et al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000; Lu, 2016).  
This study is the first that examines the relationship between government expenditures 
and the level of individual private philanthropic giving in different fields of welfare. The 
relationship we question is: To what extent is government spending associated with philanthropic 
donations? Using a new cross-country database, we are able to explore the association of 
government expenditure with (a) both the incidence and level of individual philanthropic 
donations, for (b) different welfare subsectors and (c) across 19 countries with a large diversity 
of government expenditures on welfare.  
After examining the relationship between government expenditure and private giving 
across 19 countries, we test the crowding-out hypothesis for different fields of welfare to 
understand how government expenditure may result in either crowding-out or crowding-in of 
private donations across sectors. We also examine “crosswise crowding-in”: whether increases in 
government expenditure in one field may lead to increases of individual donations in other areas.  
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Theory 
Crowding-out and crowding-in 
The central argument in the crowding-out debate is that public initiatives discourage private 
initiatives, suggesting that increases or decreases in government expenditure may persuade 
donors to decrease or increase respectively, their own contributions – to keep contributions to the 
public good constant. This assumption has been studied extensively from different disciplinary 
views, including economics and sociology.  
The crowding-out assumption follows a rational choice perspective supposing that donors 
gain utility from contributing to the public good (De Wit et al. 2017). Individual contributions to 
the public good can be made either mandatory, through government taxes, or voluntarily by 
philanthropic donations to nonprofit organizations providing that public good. If people are 
assumed to be purely altruistic and only care about realizing the public good, then increases in 
tax-financed government spending leads to a concomitant reduction of private donations, thereby 
keeping the total individual contribution (voluntary and involuntary) at the same level (Roberts, 
1984; Warr, 1982). This assumption suggests a full crowding-out: that an increase or decrease in 
public expenditures by one dollar persuades purely altruistic donors to decrease or increase, 
respectively their own philanthropic contributions by one dollar (Brooks, 2004: 168; Payne 
1998: 324).  
Another explanation for crowding-out suggests that donors hesitate to make donations to 
organizations receiving government subsidies, in contexts wherein such organizations are seen 
either as not viable, or as the long arm of the government (Brooks, 2004: 172). Scholars also 
suggest organizations receiving government subsidies, decrease their fundraising efforts among 
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the public, which result in decreased individual donations (Andreoni and Payne, 2011; Khanna 
and Sandler, 2000: 1545).   
There are arguments to expect partial rather than a full crowding-out. If individuals’ are 
not pure altruists and their motivations to give include private benefits such as the joy of giving, 
enhancing their reputation, or conforming with social norms or social pressure (Bekkers and 
Wiepking, 2011), they will give regardless of who else contributes to the public good. To the 
extent that donors derive such private benefits from the act of donating, their donations are less 
likely to be responsive to changes in contributions from a third party, such as other donors or the 
government (Andreoni, 1990; Payne, 2009).  
In contrast, the assumptions of crowding–in rely on the signaling value of government 
expenditure to imply a positive association between public and private expenditures. Donors 
generally prefer to give to organizations that are well-established, which they perceive as being 
trustworthy especially when donors face information uncertainty. Government subsidies, in some 
contexts, are seen as a “seal of approval” of the nonprofit organization (Handy, 2000; Schiff, 
1990). In addition, nonprofits may gain significant scaling advantages in their operations due to 
government support, which might increase their scope and effect, thereby motivating donors who 
care about impact of their contributions (Anheier and Toepler, 1999; Khanna and Sandler, 2000: 
1544; Rose-Ackerman, 1981).  
Furthermore, a positive correlation between government expenditures and philanthropic 
giving is expected by (neo)institutionalist theories, which posit that people adopt values and 
norms from the institutions surrounding them (Rothstein, 1998; Ingram and Clay, 2000). In this 
literature, attitudes towards social policies are shaped by the way a welfare state is structured 
(Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Jæger, 2006). Some countries prefer to spend more on health care, 
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education, and other social issues (Baumol, 1996), and it could be that generous and universal 
welfare states “socialize” people to be more benevolent. Hence, people in generous welfare 
states would develop stronger pro-social values that encourage philanthropy. 
The causal relationships between social values, welfare state generosity and philanthropy 
are hard to disentangle. If the median voter theorem holds, political outcomes are in line with 
preferences at the center of the electorate’s political spectrum, then the choices in welfare-state 
spending expresses social values. If philanthropic giving is partly an expression of similar 
values, it is reasonable to assume that government expenditures and philanthropic giving will be 
positively correlated.    
The majority of prior studies examining associations between private and public spending 
find some form of partial crowding-out, meaning that a dollar of government grants crowds-out 
donations by less than a dollar (Brooks, 2004: 173) while other studies find no significant 
relationship (Brooks, 1999), and some studies find a crowding-in effect, i.e. that the level of 
government grants is positively correlated with private donations (Andreoni and Payne, 2011; 
Hughes and Luksetich, 1999; Payne, 1998). A recent meta-analysis that systematically reviews 
previous studies on crowding-out shows that the results are strongly shaped by methods used; for 
example, in experimental studies a one dollar increase in government expenditures is associated 
with an average decrease of about 0.64 dollars, while non-experimental data analyses find a 
crowding-in effect of about 0.06 dollars on average (De Wit and Bekkers, 2017).  
 The vast part of the empirical literature is based on within-country variance in 
government spending, and has not yet addressed questions about differences between countries. 
Those studies that have examined previous cross-country studies find either positive correlations 
or no statistically significant relationship between government expenditures and philanthropic 
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donations (De Wit, 2016; Einolf, 2017; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Nguyen, 2015; Pennerstorfer and 
Neumayr, 2017; Sokolowski, 2013). Some cross-country studies examine only Western countries 
(De Wit, 2016; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Pennerstorfer and Neumayr, 2017), and it could transpire 
that these effects may not apply to other non-Western welfare state contexts. Using broader 
samples of developed and developing countries, both Sokolowski (2013) and Einolf (2017) find 
positive correlations across the board. However, these two studies show correlations only based 
on aggregate country-level statistics of individual giving behavior, which makes them vulnerable 
to the ecological fallacy (Piantadosi et al., 1988). 
In sum, different theoretical arguments lead to predictions of crowding-out or crowding-
in and the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Crowding-out hypothesis: Higher levels of total government expenditures are 
associated with lower incidence of giving and lower levels of private donations across 
nations. 
H1b: Crowding-in hypothesis: Higher levels of total government expenditures are 
associated with higher incidence of giving and higher levels of private donations across 
nations. 
 
Effects for different fields of welfare 
The crowding-out and crowding-in arguments are usually studied based on a donor’s total 
giving, however, there is reason to assume that changes in government expenditure affect private 
donations to various fields of welfare differently. Use of aggregated data may conceal or 
heighten different crowding-out effects in different sectors. For example, an aggregate finding of 
significant crowding-out does not preclude the possibilities that in one area donations have been 
 8 
 
completely crowded-out while in the other area there is partial crowding-out and in a third area 
there is no impact of increases in government expenditures, or even a partial crowding in.  
It may be expected that crowding-out is more likely in the area of social welfare when 
donors and government compete to provided similar public goods (Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011). 
In addition, when public service delivery is complex and target groups are heterogeneous, 
governments may leave service provision to nonprofit organizations, thus making crowding out 
more likely (Young, 2000).   
However, in the areas of environment, the arts or international aid, philanthropic donors 
are less likely to be discouraged by government expenditures. In these sectors, the public goods 
produced are more akin to common goods to which value is added by enjoying directly or 
indirectly (arts, reduction of poverty, clean environment, etc.) or through their provisioning 
(Klamer, 2004). As such, donating to the fields of arts, environment and international aid may be 
considered more of an expression of one’s values rather than a contribution to a public good in 
the standard economic sense, making them less susceptible to crowding out, and more to 
crowding-in.  
There is some empirical evidence that the relationship between government expenditures 
and philanthropic donations varies across welfare areas. In a systematic literature review Lu 
(2016) shows that government expenditures and philanthropic donations are generally negatively 
related in the field of human services, while they are positively related in the fields of health and 
the arts. In his cross-national study, Sokolowski (2013) found crowding-in for social services, 
health and education, but no effect in other fields. Empirical analyses on volunteering show that 
government expenditures discourage voluntary participation in social services and education, but 
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stimulate participation in recreation and culture (Day and Devlin, 1996; Stadelmann-Steffen, 
2011).    
Regarding differences between fields of welfare, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Social welfare crowding-out hypothesis: Higher levels of government expenditures 
are most strongly associated with lower incidence of giving and lower levels of private 
donations in the fields of social services and health.  
 
Effects between fields of welfare 
Based on the empirical evidence showing that changes in government expenditures affect private 
donations to different fields of welfare differently (Brooks, 2004: 173; De Wit and Bekkers, 
2017; Lu, 2016), we argue that expenditures in one field of welfare may be associated with 
increases in philanthropic giving to other fields in welfare, with the aggregate level of giving 
remaining constant. This effect has been labelled “philanthropic displacement” (Sokolowski, 
2013) or “cross-wise crowding-in” (Pennerstorfer and Neumayr, 2017). Underlying this 
assumption is the argument that people are impure altruists who have preferences for public good 
provision in more than one subsector. If multiple public goods have value in the eyes of donors, 
higher government support to one fields could lead donors to decrease donations to this field, but 
increase donations to other areas. This is also a reasonable assumption if we believe that 
individuals have a philanthropic budget, or a mental account for philanthropic giving (Thaler, 
1999).  
Supporting the notion of philanthropic displacement, Sokolowski (2013) notes that high 
levels of government expenditures in the “service” sectors of education, health, or social 
assistance lead to higher private donations in fields like arts and entertainment, human rights, 
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environmental issues, and religion. Based on similar grounds, Pennerstorfer and Neumayr (2017) 
argue that when public funding covers core-welfare fields, individuals may not necessarily 
reduce total giving, but instead donate to other related welfare issues, such as international aid. 
Results of a historical analysis on private donations in Sweden concur with these findings, 
concluding that increases in welfare state expenditure do not dampen private initiatives per se but 
rather displace civic engagement, resulting in higher levels of private giving in other fields 
(Vamstad and Von Essen, 2013).  
We thus hypothesize: 
H3: Crosswise crowding-in hypothesis: Higher levels of government expenditures in 
social services and health are associated with higher incidence of giving and higher levels 
of private donations to environment, international aid and arts and culture.  
 
 
Data  
 
We use data from the Individual International Philanthropy Database (IIPD, 2016), a novel 
dataset composed of synchronized and merged micro-level datasets on philanthropic giving from 
multiple countries. It includes data on 126,923 respondents from 19 countries, covering Australia 
(Lyons and Passey, 2007), Austria (Neumayr and Schober, 2009), Canada (CSGVP, 2004), 
France (Giving France, 2009), the Netherlands (GINPS05, 2006), the United Kingdom (Low et 
al., 2007), the United States (Wilhelm et al., 2005), Norway (Wollebæk and Sivesind, 2010), 
Finland (Auttaminen 2008), Mexico (ENAFI, 2005), South Korea (The Beautiful Foundation, 
2006), Japan (Japan Fundraising Association, 2010), Indonesia (Strauss et al., 2009), Taiwan 
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(TSCS, 2009), Israel (Haski-Leventhal et al., 2011), Ireland (HBS, 2005), Russia (CSCSNS, 
2010), Germany (SOEP, 2011; Wagner et al., 2008), and Switzerland (Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 
2007). Compared to other existing cross-country datasets on individual donations (e.g. European 
Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002), Eurobarometer 2004 (European Commission 2012), Gallup 
World Poll (CAF 2017), the IIPD has the advantage of containing information not only on the 
incidence of giving, but also on the level of giving. All data pooled in the IIPD stem from (a) 
national representative surveys (b) that deploy established modules to prompt for philanthropic 
donations and (c) include a certain set of individual level characteristics.1 The datasets included 
in the IIPD have been collected between 2004 and 2010.2 From the descriptive statistics in Table 
1 it can be seen that 63% of the respondents donate to philanthropic causes across all countries. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Dependent variables 
The incidence of giving, is the binary measure of whether an individual gives to a philanthropic 
organization or not. The level of individual philanthropic donations, the amounts donated, are 
calculated in 2012 US dollars. The sample is restricted here to individuals who indicated that 
                                                 
1 While all surveys pooled meet these criteria, research on private philanthropy is sensitive to methodology and 
measurement issues (Hall 2001; Kennedy and Vargus 2001; Rooney et al. 2001; Wilhelm 2007).This particularly 
refers to the length of the module prompting for giving (solely one question or a ‘method’- or ‘area’- module), the 
period of time the prompt refers to and the type of data collection (Rooney et al. 2004, Bekkers and Wiepking 2006, 
Kirsch et al. 2001). While all surveys (except two) included in our data have used area-modules to prompt for 
donations, and most of them refer to the previous year in their prompts, the method of data collection (e.g. computer 
assisted phone interviews, computer assisted personal interviews or computer assisted survey interviews) differs 
across the surveys. More detailed information on this is provided in the documentation of the IIPD (Wiepking and 
Handy, 2016).  
2 The years of surveys in different countries are as close to each other as data availability allowed for. 
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they give, and non-donors are excluded by listwise deletion. The average yearly amount donated 
is USD 550, which is strongly influenced by outliers at the top of the distribution. While total 
amounts donated to nonprofit organizations are available for all countries, for a smaller number 
of countries we were able to distinguish the amounts donated in the sectors (1) environment and 
animals, (2) arts and culture, (3) education and research, (4) international (relief), (5) social 
services/welfare and (6) health. Donations are strongly skewed, so large donations would have a 
disproportionate influence on the regression results. If government expenditures were to have a 
different effect on donations at the very top of the distribution than they have on the bottom and 
the middle of the distribution, this would strongly bias the results. For the graphical presentation 
of the country averages, the amounts are “Winsorized” for each country, which means that the 
top 1% of the distribution is set to the border of the 99th percentile, making the average less 
sensitive to outliers (Tukey, 1962). For the regression models, we take the natural logarithm of 
the amounts as dependent variables (we calculate the log of the total amount and the log of the 
amounts in each sector separately).  
 
Country-level predictor variables 
Data on government funding are adopted from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. The 
numbers for Korea do not appear in the IMF data and are adopted from the OECD, which uses 
the same operationalization. We use expenditures in the year 2003, so that the data reflect 
government spending preceding the measurement of philanthropic giving across all countries. 
Expenditures in the local currency are calculated in US Dollars using the exchange rates as of 
January 1, 2003 and are divided by the population in order to have the expenditures per capita. 
This broad measure of government expenditures reflects the size of welfare state efforts in 
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different domains, which not only affect the direct funding of nonprofit organizations but also 
the broader social needs in the areas in which they are working. Besides total government 
expenditures, we use expenditures in different fields of welfare as defined in the Classification of 
Functions of Government (COFOG). We adopt IMF statistics on government expenditures to (a) 
environment protection, (b) education, (c) social protection and (d) health, which we match with 
giving in sectors 1, 3, 5 and 6, respectively. Government expenditures are divided by 1,000 in 
order to use measures of comparable range.  
Both philanthropy and government efforts might be driven by a country’s economy. 
Therefore, we take GDP in US Dollars per capita (divided by 1,000) as a control variable also 
adopted from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. Control variables at the individual level 
include age, education, gender, marital status and the natural logarithm of income in US Dollars. 
In the regression analyses, respondents with missing values on any of these variables are 
excluded through listwise deletion.  
 
Analytical strategy 
We explore the data to test our theoretical ideas as outlined in the previous section in two ways. 
First, we graphically explore our data, examining the correlation between government 
expenditures and aggregated average philanthropic donations. The average philanthropic 
donation per country is calculated based on both donors and non-donors, whose donation value is 
0. Second, we run multilevel regression analyses to examine contextual effects while controlling 
for individual characteristics and allowing slopes to vary across countries. 
The decision to give or not may differ from the decision how much to give. For example, 
financial considerations are likely to be more decisive for amounts donated than for the decision 
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to make a donation (Petrovski, 2017). Therefore, we deploy separate multilevel Probit regression 
models on the probability to donate and multilevel linear regression models on the amount 
donated conditional on donating.  
In the analyses of total giving and total government expenditures, we take the sum of 
donations to different sectors for each respondent. Respondents are clustered in countries, so 
random intercepts are added when estimating the association between government expenditures 
and philanthropic donations. For the probability to donate and the amount donated, respectively, 
the following multilevel Probit regression model and multilevel linear regression model are 
deployed:  
 
P(Yij) = β0 + u0j + β1Gj + β2Cj + β3Ii + εij    (1) 
and 
ln(Yij)= = β0 + u0j + β1Gj + β2Cj + β3Ii + εij      (2) 
 
in which Y is the likelihood of giving of respondent i in country j in (1) and the amount donated 
by respondent i in country j in (2); u0 is the country-specific intercept; G is government 
expenditures in US Dollars per capita divided by 1,000; C is the control variable on the country 
level, GDP per capita divided by 1,000; and I refers to the individual control variables. Because 
the natural logarithm of the amounts donated are used, the regression takes a log-linear form 
here. 
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For the analyses on giving in different fields of welfare, a dataset is constructed in which 
the units of analysis are combinations of respondents and sectors.3 Every sector in each country 
is treated as a unique cluster for which random intercepts are added:  
 
P(Yijs) = β0 + u0js + β1Gjs + β2Cj + β3Ii + εijs    (3) 
and 
ln(Yijs) = β0 + u0js + β1Gjs + β2Cj + β3Ii + εijs    (4) 
 
in which Y is the likelihood of giving of respondent i to sector s in country j in (3) and the 
amount donated by respondent i to sector s in country j in (4); and u0 is the country-sector 
specific intercept.  
All Probit and linear regression analyses are conducted with the R statistical software. 
There is an ongoing debate about the problems associated with multilevel models in 
comparative research (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). With a number of countries below 20, we 
should be cautious with strong conclusions that hold for the total population of countries. The 
results can be taken as a first attempt to explore cross-country differences in the relationship 
between government expenditures and philanthropic giving.   
 
 
Results 
 
                                                 
3 Note that individuals can donate to multiple sectors and therefore appear in the data more than once. Adding 
random intercepts for each respondent would make the model almost unidentifiable and does not lead to 
substantially different results. 
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Aggregate giving 
Figure 1 plots the average amount donated per country with total government expenditures as US 
Dollars per capita (upper panel) and as percentage of GDP (lower panel). In Indonesia, Russia, 
Mexico, Taiwan and Korea, countries with relatively low government spending per capita, 
donations are low too. The United States and the United Kingdom have moderate government 
spending and relatively high donations. The average amount donated in the US and the UK is 
higher than in countries with high government spending per capita, like Switzerland and 
Norway. The correlation between amounts donated to philanthropic causes and government 
expenditures in USD per capita is r = 0.17 (n = 128,505, p < 0.01) in the total sample, and the 
correlation between amounts donated and government expenditures as percentage of GDP is r = 
0.04 (n = 128,505, p < 0.01). Note that correlations among individual-level data points are 
slightly different from correlations on the country level. When we would look at country 
averages rather than micro-level data, the correlations are r = 0.17 (n = 19, p = 0.49) and r = 0.02 
(n = 19, p = 0.93), respectively. 
Models 1 to 3 in Table 2 provide a more advanced statistical test of this relationship using 
probit and linear multilevel regression models. Intra-class correlations (Rho) from empty models 
(not shown) indicate that about 8% of the variance in the likelihood to donate and 41% of the 
variance in the amounts donated can be explained by country level characteristics. The left panel 
displays results of Probit models on the likelihood to be a donor. There is no significant 
association between government expenditures and the likelihood to donate, with the coefficient 
being ß=.04 in the model with full individual-level controls. The right panel displays the 
coefficients from linear models on the amount donated. Model 1 shows a positive correlation 
between government expenditures and donations. When controlled for GDP, which is positively 
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correlated with both variables of interest, the association becomes negative and non-significant 
(Model 2). A strong economy enables both extensive government spending and generous 
philanthropic giving, so the correlation in Model 1 is a spurious one. Adding individual-level 
controls makes the main effect less strongly negative (Model 3). The coefficient is ß=-.05, which 
means that a USD 1,000 increase in government expenditures is associated with a 5% decrease in 
amount donated, albeit non-significant. Thus, neither H1a nor H1b is supported by our data.  
 
[FIGURE 1] 
[TABLE 2] 
 
Giving to different fields of welfare 
How is government spending in a certain field of welfare related to philanthropic giving in the 
same field? Figure 2 shows a scatter plot in which each point is a country-sector combination, 
with the average amount donated in this sector on the y-axis and the government spending in the 
same sector on the x-axis. Both government spending and philanthropic donations are relatively 
low in the environment sector. In some sectors, there is high government spending and low 
donations like in the social sectors in the Netherlands, France and Norway. In other sectors, low 
government spending is related to high donations like the health sector in Canada, the 
educational sector in Australia, and the social sector in the US. Donations and government 
expenditures in different fields of welfare correlate positive, r = 0.07 (n = 157,014, p < 0.01) 
both when taking government expenditures per capita and when looking at government 
expenditures as percentage of GDP.  
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Table 3 provides a more systematic test of the association. Across all sectors, government 
expenditures are positively associated with the likelihood of donating, which is statistically 
significant (ß=.13 in a model with full individual-level controls). Model 4 adds interactions with 
sectors, which are all statistically significant. The relationship with the probability of giving is 
most strongly positive for government expenditures on environment. The interaction terms of 
health and social services with government expenditures are most strongly negative, which is in 
line with H2 on social welfare crowding-out. 
The right panel of Table 3 shows coefficients of the relationships with the amount 
donated. Government expenditures and donations are negatively associated, but this is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient is ß=-.07 in the model with full controls, which is 
equivalent to a decrease of 7% in donations with every USD 1,000 increase in government 
expenditures. The relationship is less strongly negative in the fields of social services and health, 
which is opposite of the expectation in the social welfare crowding-out hypothesis H2. None of 
the interaction terms, however, are statistically significant. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Effects between fields of welfare 
Next, we look at the argument of crosswise crowding-in, which states that government funding 
of core welfare state issues drives donations towards other sectors. Figure 3 plots social 
protection and health expenditures with philanthropic giving to nonprofits in the fields of social 
services and health (red dots) and environment, international relief, and arts and culture (blue 
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dots). We would expect that government expenditures for social protection and health are 
negatively related to donations in the field of social services and health but positively related to 
donations in the other fields. There seems to be some empirical support for this argument. 
Countries with high domestic social welfare expenditures tend to have lower donations to social 
services and health but higher donations to sectors like international aid and environment. 
Table 4 provides a statistical test of this crosswise crowding-in. Here, we take donations 
to environment, arts and culture, and international aid as the dependent variable. Health and 
social protection expenditures are positively associated with the likelihood to donate to 
environment, arts and culture, or international aid (ß=.15 in a model with full controls), which is 
in line with H3 on crosswise crowding-in. The amount donated to these fields, however, is not 
significantly affected (ß=-.02 in the full model). This suggests that stronger social welfare 
programs may drive donors towards the environment, arts and culture, or international aid, but 
do not lead to higher amounts donated to those areas, providing no support for H3. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
[TABLE 4] 
 
Robustness analyses 
We check for robustness of our results in three ways. First, we re-run each model excluding one 
country, or a cluster of countries at the time, because one influential cluster can drive the results 
in a certain direction. In our data, the UK and especially the USA seem to be influential cases in 
the Probit models on the likelihood to donate. Among countries other than the USA and the UK 
there is a positive correlation between government expenditures and philanthropic giving at the 
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country level (β = 0.087, p<.05), only a weak correlation on the country-sector level (β = 0.107, 
p=ns), and no evidence of crosswise crowding-in (β = 0.009, p=ns).   
Second, in order to examine whether our choice to take the natural logarithm of the 
amounts donated affects the results, we also deployed linear regression models on the amounts 
donated in US Dollars, Winsorized at 99%. These regression models yield similar results as the 
log-linear models indicating that government expenditures are not significantly associated with 
levels of philanthropic donations.  
Third, we use a different measure to account for a country’s economy. Because the 
survey data are collected in different years, the economic recession could have influenced levels 
of donation. Therefore, we re-ran each model twice, each time with either levels of 
unemployment in 2003 or the change in unemployment from the year preceding the survey to the 
year of the survey as control variable. These models do not yield substantially different results.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on different aspects of civic participation in the welfare 
state by exploring government spending as a correlate of philanthropic giving. Using a novel 
cross-country dataset, it is the first comparative analysis that (a) relates government spending to 
individual amounts donated and (b) is able to examine correlations in a number of specific fields 
of welfare where different relationships may exist. We tested our hypotheses in multilevel 
regression models controlling for a country’s economy and individual characteristics.  
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Overall, government spending and philanthropic giving is most likely to go hand in hand. 
While the relationship is not statistically significant on the aggregated country level, we find that 
government expenditures in specific fields of welfare are likely to go together with a large 
proportion of donors, even when controlling for GDP and individual-level controls. This 
confirms earlier findings with cross-national datasets on the likelihood to donate (De Wit, 2016; 
Pennerstorfer and Neumayr, 2017).  
Our analysis goes a step further, though, showing that the relationship between 
government spending and giving depends on the field of welfare studied. There is stronger 
crowding-in in the field of education and research, and, most strongly, in environment. In the 
social services and health areas, on the other hand, government spending does not strongly affect 
the number of donors.  
The study also provides evidence for the hypothesized crosswise crowding-in. 
Government expenditures in the areas of social services and health are associated with a higher 
number of donors in environment, arts and culture, and international aid, suggesting that high 
levels of social welfare spending in core-welfare fields drives donors towards other areas. This 
finding supports prior research (Pennerstorfer and Neumayr, 2017; Sokolowski, 2013) and the 
idea of donors as impure altruists.  
 A substantial contribution of this study is the finding that, at least in this sample of 
countries, the amounts donors give to philanthropic causes are not associated with government 
spending. There is no significant relationship in a model with macro- and micro-level control 
variables when looking at total giving, nor is there any evidence of correlations in specific fields 
of welfare – and this has never been studied before. If there would have been evidence for levels 
of philanthropic giving to be crowded out by welfare state efforts, this would have supported 
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arguments that private donations act as a substitute for government expenditures. It would be 
interesting to see the association between government support and donations in other contexts 
than the countries included in this study. Yet based on the current results, there is no reason to 
believe that governments and philanthropic spending are competitive.  
 An explanation for our findings might be that individuals have a more or less fixed 
budget for philanthropic giving (Thaler, 1999). In situations of low government funding, 
increasing total donations is not an option because that would exceed the household budget that 
is reserved for philanthropic giving. Within that budget, however, donors may choose their 
preferred philanthropic cause based on what they think is necessary and worthy. High 
government expenditures in social protection and health makes donations in these fields less 
urgent, so more donors will choose organizations in the fields of environment, culture and 
international aid instead of social service organizations. More research is needed to test such 
explanatory hypotheses. 
Despite the contributions this study makes, it has some limitations. First, the use of cross-
sectional data with 19 countries has some weaknesses. The results are hardly generalizable and 
one or a few exceptional countries can drive the results in a certain direction. The robustness 
checks showed that the United States and the United Kingdom are influential countries in our 
sample. Second, the database we used consists of national surveys that have been pooled in order 
to conduct cross-sectional analysis, an approach used for exploring questions that otherwise 
could not be studied due to lack of data (see van Tubergen et al. 2004 for another example). 
Though all surveys included in the IIPD are nationally representative, differences between 
countries should be interpreted with caution. Different sampling methods (Abraham et al., 2009) 
and questionnaires (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2006; Rooney et al., 2004) may lead to differences 
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in estimated donations, which might explain a part of the variance between countries. Third, it is 
difficult to deduce conclusions about the direction of causality. Both government support and 
philanthropic donations might be driven by the same underlying variables, which produce 
upwardly biased estimates. Previous studies dedicated a lot of effort to reduce this bias (Payne, 
2009), although a meta-analysis did not find systemically lower estimates with techniques that 
account for endogeneity and omitted variable bias (De Wit and Bekkers, 2017).  
 We are very well aware of the problems associated with cross-sectional research and 
multilevel analyses with a low number of clusters. However, the role of philanthropy in different 
welfare states is too important to neglect.  
 In conclusion, our results reject the hypothesis of governments and philanthropic 
donations as substitutes. The association between government expenditures and the percentage of 
donors is robustly positive, and the magnitude of giving to different sectors is not crowded out 
by government spending. The different effects found for the various fields of welfare showed 
that the capability and willingness of citizens to engage in voluntary private funding differs 
between types of public goods. Further research thus needs to differentiate between welfare areas 
when examining the question of crowding-out and crowding-in as different mechanisms are at 
play here.  Overall, by informing the debate about the role of philanthropic donations in light of 
changing government support, our findings suggest there is reason to be optimistic about 
productive government-nonprofit collaborations.  
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Figure 1: Average philanthropic donations and government expenditures (Sources: IIPD, IMF) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average philanthropic donations and government expenditures per sector 
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Figure 3: Average philanthropic donations per sector and government expenditures to social 
protection and health 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
      
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Donated 126,923 0.631 0.483 0 1 
Amount donated 72,076 549.757 2808.784 0.012 293800.000 
Donated to environment 41,911 0.144 0.352 0 1 
Amount donated to environment 4,687 109.239 473.764 0.652 24794.000 
Donated to education 40,158 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Amount donated to education 10,686 143.459 774.312 0.100 35997.620 
Donated to social services 43,848 0.474 0.499 0 1 
Amount donated to social services 17,735 147.015 760.573 0.012 47713.290 
Donated to health 43,294 0.480 0.500 0 1 
Amount donated to health 18,850 115.130 409.878 0.100 16435.340 
Donated to arts and culture 40,158 0.055 0.229 0 1 
Amount donated to arts and culture 1,824 224.786 1605.350 0.130 61985.000 
Donated to international aid 42,649 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Amount donated to international aid 5,271 229.057 522.562 0.223 17259.980 
Government expenditures per capita /1,000 126,923 10.858 8.600 0.225 30.403 
Government environment expenditures per capita /1,000 111,524 0.196 0.194 0.000 0.636 
Government education expenditures per capita /1,000 111,524 1.542 1.122 0.109 3.903 
Government social protection expenditures per capita /1,000 111,524 3.987 3.050 0.315 11.422 
Government health expenditures per capita /1,000 111,524 1.875 1.325 0.054 5.170 
      
      
      
      
GDP per capita /1,000 126,923 19.638 14.656 0.975 49.095 
Age 126,923 45.765 16.593 9.000 100.000 
Education: low 126,923 0.285 0.452 0 1 
Education: middle 126,923 0.475 0.499 0 1 
Education: high 126,923 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Male 126,923 0.489 0.500 0 1 
Married 126,923 0.601 0.490 0 1 
Household income 126,923 3.737 5.115 0 659.956 
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Table 2: Probit and Linear multilevel regression models on total giving (Sources: IIPD, IMF, OECD)  
 
 Probability Amount (ln) 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
VARIABLES 
  
    
  
  
    
Govt expenditures / 1,000 0.009 0.019 0.040 0.067** -0.093 -0.053 
 
(0.015) (0.039) (0.041) (0.032) (0.076) (0.089) 
GDP / 1,000  -0.007 -0.036  0.110** 0.057 
 
 (0.025) (0.026)  (0.048) (0.057) 
       
Constant 0.457* 0.490* -0.186 3.601*** 3.082*** 1.911*** 
 
(0.241) (0.268) (0.280) (0.523) (0.521) (0.613) 
 
      
Individual-level controls   Yes   Yes 
       
Observations 126,923 126,923 126,923 72,076 72,076 72,076 
Number of country 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Rho 0.082 0.082 0.088 0.373 0.323 0.421 
Individual-level controls: Age, Secondary education, Tertiary education, Male, Married, Income (Ln)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Probit and Linear multilevel regression models on giving to fields of welfare (Sources: IIPD, IMF, OECD) 
   
 Probability Amount (ln) 
  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES       
  
    
Govt expenditures per sector / 1,000 0.127 *** 0.120 ** 0.129 ** 2.700 *** -0.022 -0.087 -0.068 -1.453 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.059) (0.535) (0.055) (0.063) (0.071) (1.741) 
Sector: Environment    ref    Ref 
Sector: Education    -1.050    1.367 
    (1.283)    (1.634) 
Sector: Health    0.461    -0.363 
    (0.500)    (0.878) 
Sector: Social services    1.852 ***    -0.357 
    (0.566)    (1.107) 
Education * Govt expenditures / 1,000    -1.913 **    0.594 
    (0.815)    (1.871) 
Health * Govt expenditures / 1,000    -2.435 ***    1.382 
    (0.541)    (1.741) 
Social * Govt expenditures / 1,000    -2.741 ***    1.409 
    (0.536)    (1.763) 
GDP / 1,000  0.004 0.129 -0.003  0.034* 0.017 0.023 
 
 (0.010) (0.059) (0.016)  (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) 
         
Constant - 0.905*** - 1.005 *** - 1.601 *** -2.234 *** 3.878*** 3.082*** 1.919*** 2.052** 
 (0.114) (0.187) (0.446) (0.437) (0.210) (0.455) (0.505) (0.926) 
 
        
Individual-level controls   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
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Observations 157,392 157,392 157,392 157,392 49,725 49,725 49,725 49,725 
Number of country-sector 39 39 39 39 26 26 26 26 
Number of respondents 40,899 40,899 40,899 40,899 27,453 27,453 27,453 27,453 
Rho 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.132 0.225 0.196 0.208 0.242 
Individual-level controls: Age, Secondary education, Tertiary education, Male, Married, Income (Ln)  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Probit and Linear multilevel regression models on giving to environment, arts and culture, and international aid  (Sources: 
IIPD, IMF, OECD) 
 
   
 Probability Amount (ln) 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
VARIABLES       
              
Social protection and health expenditures / 1,000 0.154 *** 0.108 * 0.146 *** -0.032 -0.077 -0.016 
 
(0.030) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.067) (0.046) 
GDP / 1,000 
 
0.026 0.011 
 
0.031 0.014 
  
(0.020) (0.023) 
 
(0.026) (0.018) 
Age 
  
0.006 *** 
  
0.010*** 
   
(0.000) 
  
(0.001) 
       
Constant -2.342 *** -2.695 *** -3.193 *** 4.326*** 3.778*** 2.497*** 
 
(0.239) (0.302) (0.434) (0.469) (0.664) (0.477) 
       
Individual-level controls   Yes   Yes 
       
Observations 115,825 115,825 115,825 11,245 11,245 11,245 
Number of Country-sector combinations 28 28 28 17 17 17 
Number of respondents 40,899 40,899 40,899 9,180 9,180 9,180 
Rho 0.123 0.119 0.115 0.175 0.169 0.181 
Individual-level controls: Age, Secondary education, Tertiary education, Male, Married, Income (Ln)  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
